Obama’s No-Show and ASEAN Centrality

Obama addresses university students during a previous trip to Indonesia in 2010. Credit: Flickr U.S. Embassy, Jakarta

While the unforeseen cancellation of US President Obama’s trip to Southeast Asia will dominate the headlines for many, the dominant long-term trends currently shaping the Asia-Pacific geostrategic environment remains the U.S. pivot and China’s rise. The on-going competition between these two powers is perhaps aptly described by the following idiom: “When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” Sadly for those with a pessimistic persuasion, ASEAN is that grass.

However, for those attending The Habibie Center’s Talking ASEAN dialogue on September 17, 2013, a more positive approach was subscribed to. In particular, ‘ASEAN Centrality’ was seen as a way in which ASEAN could be more than just grass; instead being a player in its own right.

ASEAN Centrality had notched up a number of significant achievements enabling the regional organization to make significant contributions in the economic and security fields. ASEAN is now driving economic cooperation in the region, attracting the attention of the world to the lucrative potential of a group made up of ten small and middle sized countries. It had also successfully introduced the notions of “cooperative security” and “comprehensive security.”

Indeed, even the two elephants appreciate the value of ASEAN Centrality. The U.S. – viewing Asia-Pacific as instrumental for the future of the American economy – wished to avoid seeing a regional hegemon dominating ASEAN and regarded freedom of navigation as a national interest. Thus, the U.S. pivot involves empowering regional institutions and helping to build a regional economic architecture that could sustain shared prosperity.

Similarly, it was noted that Beijing benefited enormously from ASEAN-China trade, which in 2012 stood at USD 318 billion. It therefore made sense for China to want a stronger, cohesive, and well-functioning ASEAN to gain even more economic benefits. Also, supporting ASEAN Centrality would ensure ASEAN’s neutrality in Beijing’s various disputes with others in the region by obliging ASEAN to be an honest and impartial party.

Despite the obvious benefits of supporting ASEAN, not to mention the official support of Washington D.C. and Beijing for ASEAN Centrality, there remained some concerns. The U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations raised questions on whether the U.S. was undermining the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) process. At the same time there were question marks over how serious one should take China’s endorsement of ASEAN Centrality given the controversy surrounding Beijing’s interference of Cambodia’s 2012 chairmanship of ASEAN.

These concerns reinforce the fact that the strategic relevance of ASEAN Centrality should not be externally driven. The speculations over US President Obama’s cancelled trip to the region and its significance on ASEAN Centrality testifies to the shakiness of an externally driven ASEAN Centrality. Rather than being the victims of two elephants fighting, ASEAN should not only become a player itself but must also play its own game. At The Habibie Center’s Talking ASEAN dialogue, it was recommended that ASEAN act like a young lady, making herself attractive and interesting for global suitors. Picking one side was therefore akin to marrying herself too early, thereby losing her strategic relevance. Moreover, instead of playing the classical zero-sum game of winners and losers, ASEAN should adopt a positive-sum game that created win-win situations for all. Open regionalism ought to be included in such a game so that ASEAN, the two elephants, and the grass – other nations in the region – could all prosper.

However in order for this to happen, there was a number of homework ASEAN needed to complete beforehand. First, to ensure ASEAN remain attractive and interesting, it needed to address current worries surrounding the economic situation of some of its member-states; including its largest member, Indonesia. The outside world’s clamour for ASEAN was largely driven by the expected economic growth of the ASEAN region and the resulting opportunities that it would bring to others.

Second, ASEAN should remind itself that ASEAN Centrality consisted of two dimensions: internal and external. There was no point of ASEAN projecting itself as an important player to the world, capable of solving global issues if it could not deal with its own internal problems. In this sense, a fundamental element of ASEAN Centrality is ASEAN unity; something that recent events showed should not always be taken for granted.

Lastly, ASEAN needs to enhance its capabilities to deal with real issues. Presently ASEAN is very good at dealing with aspirational calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue. Indeed it has played its part in organizing talks between disputing parties in the past and continues to do so through such processes as the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit. The fact remains, however, that ASEAN is rather impotent when it comes to applying such aspirations in the face of real issues. The Korean Peninsula Crisis earlier this year highlighted the absent role of ASEAN in efforts to calm the possibility of crossing the nuclear brink. At the same time, ASEAN appears to be more of an event organizer rather than an effective facilitator and mediator between disputing parties.

There is no doubting the wisdom of ASEAN Centrality. By working on the homework identified above, ASEAN Centrality can start moving beyond simple rhetoric and become a permanent state of mind that shapes, informs and dictates our every action as ASEAN moves ahead into the future.

[This article was first published in The Jakarta Post on 8th October 2013 and can be found at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/08/obama-s-no-show-and-asean-centrality.html]