Squaring the Triangle in Indonesia-Taiwan Relations: A Political Perspective

Indonesia's Foreign Minister Addresses Legislators in Jakarta. [Credit: Flickr The Official CTBTO Photostream]

Like any other relationships, the one between Taiwan and Indonesia is characterised by certain similarities and differences. These provide cooperative avenues of opportunity but also difficult challenges. And just like in any relationship, the central questions become how to maximise these similarities, how to mitigate those differences, and how best to work together to overcome the challenges so as to ensure the greatest good can be enjoyed by the greatest number of people from both sides. However, unlike other relationships, the Taiwan-Indonesia one is dictated by a number of contradictions that complicate the latter’s policy towards the former. In particular are three issues that together form a “Triangle” in Indonesia-Taiwan Relations.

The first issue or side to this “Triangle” is Jakarta’s adherence to the One-China Policy. While the Yudhoyono Administration has committed itself to “a million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy, problems arise when two of those friends do not always see eye-to-eye with one another. In the face of tensions between China and Taiwan, Indonesia (like many others) adheres to a One-China Policy. Although in theory, the ambiguity of the policy allows Indonesia to appease both sides, in practice it has tended to come down the side of China. This is seen by the lesser diplomatic representation Indonesia operates with Taiwan: a Taipei Economic & Trade Office (TETO) in Jakarta and an Indonesian Economic and Trade Office (KDEI) in Taipei (as opposed to a full Embassy).

The second side to the “Triangle” is Indonesia’s adoption of a democratic agenda as a key aspect of its foreign policy. This was seen in the way Jakarta strongly pushed its fellow ASEAN member-states to adopt the ASEAN Concord II in 2003 where for the first time democracy and human rights were mentioned as core values that ASEAN aspired to. It is therefore a paradox that despite Indonesia’s democratic agenda, Jakarta has full diplomatic relations with China – despite its continued one-party system – and lesser diplomatic relations with Taiwan – despite its full embrace of democracy. This undermines the fact that the democratic developments in Taiwan and Indonesia from the mid-to-late 1990’s bears certain shared similarities in their experiences. Moreover, they both face matching challenges where some members of the public have become despondent with the unfulfilled dividends of democracy. These shared similarities and matching challenges would normally and naturally lead to closer Taiwan-Indonesia diplomatic relations. One could reasonably expect Indonesia, in its efforts to push a democratic agenda in the region, to forge alliances with other shining examples of democracies in Asia, allowing each side to learn, support and assist one another in advancing not only their own democracies but that of the region. That such an alliance does not exist is therefore odd.

The third side to the “Triangle” concerns the rise of China – politically, militarily and economically. As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia is well aware of the complications China’s rise presents to the region. At the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AFMM), held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July 2012, ASEAN found itself divided over how to respond to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The disagreement led to the unprecedented non-issuance of a Joint Communiqué at the 45th AFMM with the hosts, Cambodia facing accusations its position as Chair of ASEAN for 2012 was compromised by its close relations with China.

With changes at the very top of China’s political leadership about to take place this month, there are greater uncertainties about Beijing’s future directions in its relations with its neighbours, the region and the wider world. The emergence of a “Princelings” vs “Populists” factionalism coupled with a slowing economy have coincided with a heightened wave of mainland Chinese nationalism. Where does this leave Taiwan-Indonesia Relations as they deal with the issue of a rising China? For Indonesia, it necessitates treading carefully but this has the unfortunate effect of hand-braking cooperation between Taiwan and Indonesia across the multiple pillars of politics, trade and socio-culture.

Taking the three sides of the “Triangle” into account, the question becomes: How to “Square the Triangle?” The answer is neither easy nor is it clear. In the long term, the establishment of full and formal diplomatic relations may be needed. In the short-term, however, greater trust, openness and confidence need to be built between Indonesians and Taiwanese. China should also be involved in any process and their sensitivities be accommodated to. Genuine personal friendships and networks should be fostered between Indonesians and Taiwanese, not only among policy-makers or government officials but also among academics, the media, members of NGOs/CSOs and especially the youths. Greater people-to-people linkages among this latter group are particularly important as they will be the movers, shakers and drivers that shape the future of Indonesia-Taiwan Relations. By building greater trust, openness & confidence, by fostering genuine personal friendships and networks, & by facilitating greater people-to-people linkages can we hope to maximise our similarities, mitigate the differences, and best work together to overcome the challenges so as to ensure the greatest good can be enjoyed by the greatest number of people from both Indonesia and Taiwan.

[This article was first published in The China Post on 15th December 2012 and can be found at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/letters/2012/12/15/364203/Squaring-the.htm]