Jokowi's trip to Japan and China: A game-changer?
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| Indonesia's presidential plane prepares to land [Credit: DetikNews] |
As the dust settles from President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s state visits to Japan and China - his first outside of the ASEAN region - a key question raised was: was it a ‘game-changer’?
Fueling this question are a number of controversial headline-grabbing reports that accompanied the President’s trip. Most notably was Jokowi’s statement that Beijing’s nine-dotted-line ‘has no basis in any international law’.
This was seen as the first time the President has publicly taken a position on the South China Sea issue, despite Indonesia officially not being a claimant party.
At the same time, Indonesia and Japan announced what was reported by some media as a defense pact. The Wall Street Journal, for example, pointed out that ‘Many of China’s neighbors are strengthening ties among themselves to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness’. As such, there is the suggestion that Indonesia’s agreement with Japan was made in response to China.
Does this then imply a departure from Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy of ‘rowing between two reefs’?
A closer inspection of the two items that fuel the above questions suggest otherwise. First, the President’s position on the nine-dotted line does not contradict the official stance taken by Indonesia. In July 2010, Indonesia issued Note No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 to the United Nations declaring that China’s nine-dotted line ‘clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset[ing] the UNCLOS 1982’. As such the President’s position is not a break away from the country’s official stance.
Second, the ‘Memorandum on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense’ - to use its proper term - is not the counter-China defense pact some have made it out to be. For one thing, the memorandum explicitly states that there are ‘no legally binding rights or obligations’ for either parties.
Fueling this question are a number of controversial headline-grabbing reports that accompanied the President’s trip. Most notably was Jokowi’s statement that Beijing’s nine-dotted-line ‘has no basis in any international law’.
This was seen as the first time the President has publicly taken a position on the South China Sea issue, despite Indonesia officially not being a claimant party.
At the same time, Indonesia and Japan announced what was reported by some media as a defense pact. The Wall Street Journal, for example, pointed out that ‘Many of China’s neighbors are strengthening ties among themselves to counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness’. As such, there is the suggestion that Indonesia’s agreement with Japan was made in response to China.
Does this then imply a departure from Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy of ‘rowing between two reefs’?
A closer inspection of the two items that fuel the above questions suggest otherwise. First, the President’s position on the nine-dotted line does not contradict the official stance taken by Indonesia. In July 2010, Indonesia issued Note No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 to the United Nations declaring that China’s nine-dotted line ‘clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset[ing] the UNCLOS 1982’. As such the President’s position is not a break away from the country’s official stance.
Second, the ‘Memorandum on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense’ - to use its proper term - is not the counter-China defense pact some have made it out to be. For one thing, the memorandum explicitly states that there are ‘no legally binding rights or obligations’ for either parties.
Similarly, the scope of the memorandum is limited to such things as defense ministerial level meetings, dialogue and consultation between defense institutions, cooperation on capacity-building, exchange of information, education, training, exchange visits, and cooperation on defense equipment and technology, among others.
As such, Jakarta is far from entering a collective security alliance with Tokyo in defiance of the ‘bebas-aktif’ (free-and-active) foreign policy concept Indonesia subscribes to.
Indeed, it is worth noting that many of the activities Indonesia has agreed to carry out with Japan can equally be found in its agreement with China. For example, while much attention was given to the announcement that Indonesia and Japan would establish a maritime forum, it has gone relatively unnoticed that Jakarta also agreed to ‘make good use of such mechanisms as… navy dialogue’ with Beijing. Indonesia and China further agreed to ‘encourage the establishment of dialogue forums between other armed forces of the two countries’.
In any case, both the Jakarta-Beijing navy dialogue and the Jakarta-Tokyo maritime forum will need to answer such questions as who will organize such events, what will be the issues covered, and at what track level will it be held?
Having critiqued the President’s visit to Japan, it is only fair to also examine some of the key elements of Jokowi’s trip to China. While most of the headlines were dominated by the ‘highly complementary' nature of Jokowi’s world maritime fulcrum proposal and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s maritime silk-road initiative, there were a number of other matters worth observing.
For example, it was interesting to note that President Jokowi and President Xi agreed to ‘give each other firm support on important issues concerning their respective core interests’. It should be remembered that back in 2010, Chinese officials were reported to have asserted the South China Sea as a ‘core national interest’ of Beijing.
Curiously, although President Xi only ‘reaffirmed China’s support’ for Indonesia’s national unity and territorial integrity, Jokowi ‘reiterated Indonesia’s firm commitment’ to the One China Policy. In the world of diplomacy, the difference between mere ‘support’ and ‘firm commitment’ is arguably more than just an issue of mere pedantry.
It is also worth highlighting that on the South China Sea, Indonesia and Japan stressed the importance of the rule of law, and furthermore, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ‘welcomed President Jokowi’s commitment to proactively contribute to this issue’.
In stark contrast, Indonesia and China could only agree to resolve the issue on the basis of consensus through consultations, with no mention made of Indonesia’s possible involvement.
For one thing, Jokowi’s trip to Japan and China was far from the game changer that some have claimed.
Indonesia has not suddenly departed from its ‘bebas-aktif’ foreign policy concept. If anything, Jokowi is merely continuing his predecessor’s policy of a million friends and zero enemies, building on Indonesia’s strategic partnership with Japan and its comprehensive strategic partnership with China.
However, there are a number of lessons that the President should heed. First, Indonesia must be careful not to be caught in the power struggle between Japan and China. That Jokowi’s nine-dotted-line comment was misleadingly represented in Japan and that the President gave his firm support to China’s core interests, unnecessarily put Indonesia in a difficult position that later required some efforts to clarify.
Second, Indonesia needs to remind both Japan and China that their interest in developing closer relations with Jakarta should be based on Indonesia’s own merit. Just as Indonesia does not enter into any agreements for the ulterior motive of balancing or containing others, so too must Jakarta insist that others are only interested in Indonesia on the country’s own merits, and that any agreements bring real benefits to the people of Indonesia.
As such, Jakarta is far from entering a collective security alliance with Tokyo in defiance of the ‘bebas-aktif’ (free-and-active) foreign policy concept Indonesia subscribes to.
Indeed, it is worth noting that many of the activities Indonesia has agreed to carry out with Japan can equally be found in its agreement with China. For example, while much attention was given to the announcement that Indonesia and Japan would establish a maritime forum, it has gone relatively unnoticed that Jakarta also agreed to ‘make good use of such mechanisms as… navy dialogue’ with Beijing. Indonesia and China further agreed to ‘encourage the establishment of dialogue forums between other armed forces of the two countries’.
In any case, both the Jakarta-Beijing navy dialogue and the Jakarta-Tokyo maritime forum will need to answer such questions as who will organize such events, what will be the issues covered, and at what track level will it be held?
Having critiqued the President’s visit to Japan, it is only fair to also examine some of the key elements of Jokowi’s trip to China. While most of the headlines were dominated by the ‘highly complementary' nature of Jokowi’s world maritime fulcrum proposal and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s maritime silk-road initiative, there were a number of other matters worth observing.
For example, it was interesting to note that President Jokowi and President Xi agreed to ‘give each other firm support on important issues concerning their respective core interests’. It should be remembered that back in 2010, Chinese officials were reported to have asserted the South China Sea as a ‘core national interest’ of Beijing.
Curiously, although President Xi only ‘reaffirmed China’s support’ for Indonesia’s national unity and territorial integrity, Jokowi ‘reiterated Indonesia’s firm commitment’ to the One China Policy. In the world of diplomacy, the difference between mere ‘support’ and ‘firm commitment’ is arguably more than just an issue of mere pedantry.
It is also worth highlighting that on the South China Sea, Indonesia and Japan stressed the importance of the rule of law, and furthermore, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ‘welcomed President Jokowi’s commitment to proactively contribute to this issue’.
In stark contrast, Indonesia and China could only agree to resolve the issue on the basis of consensus through consultations, with no mention made of Indonesia’s possible involvement.
For one thing, Jokowi’s trip to Japan and China was far from the game changer that some have claimed.
Indonesia has not suddenly departed from its ‘bebas-aktif’ foreign policy concept. If anything, Jokowi is merely continuing his predecessor’s policy of a million friends and zero enemies, building on Indonesia’s strategic partnership with Japan and its comprehensive strategic partnership with China.
However, there are a number of lessons that the President should heed. First, Indonesia must be careful not to be caught in the power struggle between Japan and China. That Jokowi’s nine-dotted-line comment was misleadingly represented in Japan and that the President gave his firm support to China’s core interests, unnecessarily put Indonesia in a difficult position that later required some efforts to clarify.
Second, Indonesia needs to remind both Japan and China that their interest in developing closer relations with Jakarta should be based on Indonesia’s own merit. Just as Indonesia does not enter into any agreements for the ulterior motive of balancing or containing others, so too must Jakarta insist that others are only interested in Indonesia on the country’s own merits, and that any agreements bring real benefits to the people of Indonesia.
[This article was first published in The Jakarta Post on 13th April 2015 and can be found at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/13/jokowi-s-trip-japan-and-china-a-game-changer.html]
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