Indonesia’s MIKTA dilemma needs immediate solution

The Namdaemun Gate in Seoul, South Korea.  (Credit Flickr Belle Nachmann]

Back in 2013, the five foreign ministers from Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly for what would later become known as MIKTA.

To date the MIKTA initiative has witnessed (a) five meetings of the foreign ministers, (b) a number of statements released on pressing subjects such as the Ebola outbreak, the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 and the situation in North Korea, (c) the establishment of various networks catering to academics, journalists and parliamentary speakers and (d) in the past month, the holding of a MIKTA academic seminar in Canberra.

A strange collection of countries though MIKTA may seem on first sight (and perhaps on second and even third), it is claimed that this 'innovative partnership... is based on shared similar values and interests'.

In particular, MIKTA countries are said to be serious economic powers with strategic weight and a shared commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade and open economies.

Curiously, it has been claimed that MIKTA’s strength lies not in its commonalities but instead in the disparities between the five countries. If so, one could ask, 'why not replace South Korea with North Korea?’ for example, in order to maximize the group’s diversity and make things really interesting. One thing for certain, however, is that the MIKTA initiative presents a dilemma for Jakarta.

As alluded to earlier, the MIKTA countries are a disparate bunch whose respective bilateral ties with Indonesia are somewhat questionable.

In the case of Indonesia’s relationship with Mexico, 17,000 kilometers separate the two countries’ capitals, which may explain why there were only 2,252 visitors from Indonesia to Mexico in 2013.

For Indonesia-Korea relations, while the two are located in the same Asia-Pacific region, it is worth noting the collapse of negotiations between the two sides over a potential Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) due to disagreements over investment guarantees.

For Indonesia-Turkey ties, despite both being Muslim-majority countries, it has been noted that there have been a limited number of high level visits between the leaders of the two countries. Indeed, the then Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s visit to Ankara in 2010 was the first state visit by an Indonesian head of state to Turkey in 25 years.

Similarly Turkey’s then president Abdullah Gul’s visit to Jakarta in 2011 was the first state visit by a Turkish head of state to Indonesia in 16 years. Just recently President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Jakarta to further boost Turkey’s economic and intelligence cooperation with Indonesia.

Lastly, Indonesia’s relations with its immediate neighbor, Australia, are best described as ‘rocky’ with tensions arising over allegations that Australian intelligence spied on Yudhoyono and his inner circle, Canberra’s implementation of its 'stop the boats' policy and Jakarta’s execution of two Australian nationals convicted for drug smuggling.

Worryingly, at the people-to-people level, a recent survey by the Lowy Institute found that only 34 percent of Australians considered its closest neighbor to be a democracy, despite that being one of the few things that supposedly unites MIKTA together.

With such questionable relations between Jakarta and its fellow MIKTA countries it is unsurprising that Indonesia has thus far shown very little enthusiasm for the MIKTA initiative. When the average Indonesian has little awareness or knowledge of ASEAN - despite it being a Southeast Asian grouping that arguably makes more sense, having existed since 1967 and being set to launch the ASEAN Community by the end of this year - what hope does MIKTA have?

For government officials and policy makers operating within the confines of limited resources, can we really expect them to welcome the MIKTA initiative with open arms given the significant departure from Jakarta’s traditional concentric circle-based foreign policy whereby greater priority is given to Indonesia’s immediate neighborhood? Revealingly, Indonesia will likely be the last of the five countries to host a MIKTA foreign ministers meeting, with Mexico holding the first in 2013, South Korea in 2014 and Australia later this year.

Thus we come to Indonesia’s MIKTA dilemma. On the one hand, there can be no doubting the potential that the MIKTA initiative presents. Yet, on the other hand major challenges remain. Having already committed to MIKTA, it will be difficult for Jakarta to exit the grouping without significant embarrassment and a loss of face.

Equally embarrassing, however, would be if Indonesia were to fully engage in the initiative only for it to implode on its own given the obstacles highlighted above.

At present Indonesia has adopted a somewhat strategic ambivalence in its response to the MIKTA dilemma with the government remaining 'cautiously optimistic' and positioning itself on the fence. However, time is not on Indonesia’s side and sooner or later Jakarta will need to get off the proverbial fence and decide how it wishes to approach its MIKTA dilemma.

[This article was first published in The Jakarta Post on 11th August 2015 and can be found at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/11/indonesia-s-mikta-dilemma-needs-immediate-solution.html]