China, the push factor for ASEAN-India relations?
Flags of China and India are installed in Beijing ahead of a visit [Credit: South China Morning Post] |
On 26 January 2018, President Joko Widodo together with the other nine leaders of ASEAN will attend India’s Republic Day ceremony in New Delhi. This historic moment – which will also see India’s Prime Minister Narenda Modi host a special ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in conjuction with 25 years of dialogue partnership – comes at an opportune time.
For one thing, New Delhi is looking to capitalize on its ‘Act East’ policy, whilst ASEAN capitals, especially Jakarta, start to place more prominence on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a regional concept. There is no doubt that in the coming days we will hear much about the importance that both ASEAN and India place in their relationship.
Prime Minister Modi will likely build on the commitments of his predecessors who first laid the foundations for the ‘Look East’ policy in the early 1990s. Then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once declared, “India’s engagement with…ASEAN is at the heart of our ‘Look East’ Policy” and it was Modi that took the decision to upgrade the policy to ‘Act East’ in 2014.
Mention will also likely be made of the shared heritage of civilization, culture and interaction that stretches over two millenia between India and ASEAN countries. It was French historian, George Coedes who famously refered to the great Southeast Asian kingdoms such as the Srivijayan and Majpahit empires as the ‘Indianized States.’ Indeed, many scholars at the time described Southeast Asia as ‘Farther India’, as if it were merely an extension of the subcontinent. One only needs to look at the many historic Hindu and Buddhist temples that can be found across the region such as Indonesia’s Borobudur and Prambanan, Cambodia’s Angkor Wat and Lao PDR’s Wat Phuin.
In the area of economy, ASEAN-India trade stood at USD 70 billion in 2016-2017, an increase of USD 5 billion from the previous year. As a result, ASEAN is India’s fourth largest trading partner whilst India is ASEAN’s eighth largest trading parnter. As a party to the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) currently under negotiations, the total trade between the two sides is expected to further improve. A recent report by the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) predicted that India would be the world’s third largest economy in 2032, and Indonesia – the largest economy in ASEAN – being in tenth place.
Despite the above, there are a few concerns regarding the ASEAN-India relationship that call into question the Act East policy and forces us to examine are we really looking in the same direction. For example, the deadline for concluding negotiations for RCEP has been pushed back for the third time with Indian resistance often cited as one of the key stumbling blocks. New Delhi has insisted that the services sector – where it is a global leader - should be opened up to offset concerns that India would be flooded by goods produced in China and other RCEP members. Only last month, India’s Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told a parliamentary committee that New Delhi ‘should exercise due restraint and not conclude trade agreements which are not to our medium-term advantage.’
It is not just at the government level where resistance can be found. At the business level, one expert, Dr. Farish Ahmad Noor, decried the “piecemeal” nature of Indian investment in ASEAN adding that India’s presence in ASEAN’s markets pales in comparison to that of China. It has also been noted that India’s private sector have been reticent to move into Southeast Asia, in stark contrast to that of Chinese companies.
Comparisons of the engagement of India and China with ASEAN highlight another key issue in the ASEAN-India relationship: that it is only being pushed in reaction to the rise of Beijing. Numerous articles calling for closer ASEAN-India relations often cite the need to balance the rise of China. Again, it may be questioned are we really looking in the right direction or does ASEAN and India have one eye on China. For example, it has been suggested that India was a ‘natural remedy’ available to ASEAN to counter the asymmetric interdependence that characterised ASEAN-China relations as well as the address the shared security problems and concerns faced by both ASEAN and India over China’s assertiveness.
What the above case demonstrates is the way in which ASEAN-India relations are being pushed by the China factor rather than pulled by the merits and opportunities of closer ASEAN-India cooperation.
That is not to say that ASEAN does not have its own shortcomings. An ongoing study by The Habibie Center found that only one ASEAN member-state grants Indian citizens free visa entry: Indonesia. Meanwhile, in terms of direct flights between the capitals of ASEAN member-states and New Delhi, these exist only for New Delhi-Bangkok, New Delhi-Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi-Singapore. It is therefore unsurprising that in 2015, only 3.3 million Indians visited ASEAN countries, whilst barely 700,000 citizens of Southeast Asian nations went to India. Such statistics are worrying given that great people-to-people linkages are critical to effectively cement ASEAN-India relations.
Clearly, more work needs to be done by both sides. On the one hand, much has been made of the historical ties that bind us, and the future potentials that may be achieved if we can work together. On the other hands we must admit our shortcomings and acknowledge the areas where we can improve more. The events surrounding this week are a good place to start. Let us hope it can be the springboard towards an ASEAN-India partnership where both sides are looking in the same direction without an eye on other powers.
[This article was first published in The Jakarta Post on 26th January 2018 and can be found at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/01/26/china-the-push-factor-for-asean-india-relations.html]
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